Why STS-133 was scrubbed

November 9, 2010 - Reading time: 2 minutes

Historical note: all of this. I still agree with this 100%, inside NASA and also basically everywhere.

We know the official reasons for the series of STS-133 launch scrubs last week.  Weather, anomalous readings, and finally the hydrogen leak and subsequently noticed foam/ice issue.

Those things seem pretty familiar.  On the surface, they're reasonable.  Funny electrical readings - certainly a problem.  A leaking hydrogen valve - certainly a problem.  And we all know what foam and ice can do to an Orbiter.

What's not mentioned is why those problems occur.  Sure, there will be investigations and "root cause" analysis (a ridiculous pursuit with a worthless conclusion) but I think a lot of people miss the deeper issues at hand.

The Shuttle fleet has been flying for almost 30 years.  In that time, the STS has undergone a couple of major overhauls, with weight reductions and technology improvements.  But something has been missed in the 3 decades of operation: continuous, incremental improvements.

Shall I be charitable?  Fine.  There have been some incremental technology improvements and there have been some process improvements.  But not really to the degree there should have been.  The reason is simple and not uncommon in big organizations, but disappointing nonetheless: the Shuttle program suffers from a shortsighted institutional inertia. 

The inertia manifests itself in a simple way: when people find small problems, inefficiencies, or parts that could be improved, there is generally no action taken.  People can submit various types of requests, e-mail their managers, and so on, but the end result tends to be the same - you can't just make changes; the certification process is too expensive and time consuming, the risks are too high, the problems aren't bad enough to justify the expenditures.  Operational workarounds are always viewed as cheaper than actually fixing problems.  The result is a state of perpetual glitch - known problems, huge binders full of procedures and workarounds, an over-reliance on collegial knowledge.  Because change is difficult, maybe even a bit scary, it is not undertaken.  Changes that could result in workforce reductions are especially scary and unusual.  When looking at an individual improvement, it's not such a big deal.  A penny here, a penny there.  We can't do them all.  But en masse, the missed opportunities represent a significant cost to the program.

The result is a spacecraft and program that despite being fantastic, earn their reputations as unreliable, expensive, and inefficient.

Smart people at NASA are thwarted by layers of management who are afraid to take risks, unwilling to defend good ideas, and unable to drive improvements.  This is why STS-133 was scrubbed.